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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
In summing up a life-long study of the ways of judges
and the methods of decision making, Karl Llewellyn used
to say in conversation that when the common law functioned
at its best, the judges aimed simultaneously at three things:
to do justice in the case at hand; to see that the result
was harmonious with the central body of law; and to so
cast the decision that its rule would usefully serve the
future.
The first, Llewellyn thought, involved a sense of fair-
ness; the second, a feeling for legal order and arrangement;
the third was an act of creative legal statesmanship.
This sharp insight into the ways of common law judges
fits the historical facts and articulates that which is often
left implicit in the greatest judicial writing. It describes,
indeed, the necessities of the role of decision at common
law.
No one could work closely with Chief Judge Charles
S. Desmond or read many of his opinions without sensing
that Llewellyn's generalization fit closely the spirit of
approach and the method of execution which he followed
regularly in his work in the New York Court of Appeals.
He was, first of all, activated by an instinctive sense
of justice immediately responsive to conditions of demon-
strated unfairness or legal deprivation.
This sort of initial and instinctive reaction to in-
justice-visceral if you will-has beyond all doubt played
a critical part in common law development, even in those
tribunals which explicitly and coldly regard themselves as
courts of "law" and nothing else. One has to look very
far for a -truly great judicial opinion-great by the stan-
dards of the profession-which sanctions an injustice. The
Chief Judge's innate intuition for the truly just result
was in harmony with this common law pattern.
But he worked within the requirements of the well-
worn conventions. He kept closely attuned to the materials
which make for legal order and arrangement. He was
assiduous in finding cases, in reading them understandingly
and in citing them when pertinent.
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His sense of justice as instinct or intuition never led
him to cut loose from the hard realities of legal method.
Justice was to be achieved within the available range of
choices and possibilities as framed by statute and case law.
The range is doubtless wide; but it has limits to which
he adhered.
Finally, and this must be taken as the cherished
ambition of the good judge, he was sensitive to the future
value of the rule of the case. The decision as he projected
its effect had to serve and not stifle the need of tomorrow's
community so far as our eyes are able to see the road
that lies ahead.
Judge Desmond's total contribution to New York law
during his quarter of a century on the Court of Appeals
in the adaptation of old rules to meet new and predictable
situations is of prime signmificance. Hundreds of opinions
over this long period give evidence of this total and balanced
contribution. Illustration is, perhaps, best made by a
random sampling of the run-of-the-mill cases, the usual
method of statistics, without looking out for the "great"
cases.
For this purpose we might read at random three cases
appearing in volumes four, five and seven of the iNew York
Reports, second series.
In McConnell v. Conmonwealth Pictures Corp.,' plain-
tiff had a legally well-formulated contract with defendant
that if he succeeded in negotiating with a motion picture
producer to give defendant distribution rights, defendant
would pay him certain sums of money. Plaintiff procured
the distribution rights, but the defense to his action was
that he had obtained the rights by bribing a representative
of the producer. Against strong arguments in dissent that
this did not affect the obligation of the contract, Judge
Desmond carried the decision to a reversal of the appellate
division in an opinion which illustrates what must have
initially been an instinctive feeling that wrongdoing as
17 N.Y.2d 465, 166 N.E.,d 494, 199 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1960).
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thus shown must not get judicial help even in support
of a contract:
All we are doing here is labeling the conduct described in these
defenses as gross corruption depriving plaintiff of all right of
access to the courts of New York State. Consistent with public
morality and settled public policy, we hold that a party will be
denied recovery even on a contract valid on its face, if it appears
that he has resorted to gravely immoral and illegal conduct in
accomplishing its performance.2
One might look, too, at his opinion in Berkshire Fine
Spinning Associates, Inc. v. City of New York' to see close
attention, within the conventions of judicial writing, to a
complicated tax problem and the balanced examination of
a wide range of decisional law running through six pages
of opinion leading to the recommended result.
The creative casting of a rule for the future, arising
from a decision of the present, as the common law practice
was, is to be seen in Sengstack v. Sengstack.4  A mentally
ill wife, not adjudged incompetent, was permitted to sue
her husband for separation against the arguments that she
was without legal capacity to sue and her attorneys were
without authority to institute the action. The process of
making a just rule and a procedurally supportable rule
in an unusual situation is to be seen step by step as one
follows the Desmond logic to the end.
Through the long judicial career this sensitive aware-
ness of the justice of the case; this felt necessity to act
within the conventional frame of decisional law; this cre-
ative molding of the law to meet new needs as they arise
and can be foreseen, suggest that the tradition which
Charles S. Desmond followed was in the mainstream of
the common law.
FRANCIS BERGAN.*
* Associate Judge of the Court of Appeals of the State of New York.
2Id. at 471, 166 N.E.2d at 497, 199 N.Y.S.2d at 487.
35 N.Y.2d 347, 157 N.E.2d 614, 184 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1959).
4 4 N.Y.Z4 502, 151 N.E.2d 887, 176 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1958).
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